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The present moment is a good one to compare government attitudes in Canada 
and Britain to broadcasting, for in both countries Conservative governments 
have been developing new policies for broadcasting. The Canadian situation of- 
fers the British observer an interesting contrast with the one which pertains in 
his own country. The convergences do not appear quite where they might be ex- 
pected and the divergences are rather surprising. 
Canada has always regarded communications as fundamental to the crea- 
tion and maintenance of the Canadian nation. From Sir John Macdonald's deter- 
mination to push the railroad through the Rockies to the Pacific as part of his 
grand plan for the federal unification of the country, to the provision of satellite 
television for indigenous communities we see the same underlying belief that in 
a country as large and as sparsely populated as Canada, development and con- 
trol of communications is a sine qua non of the nation's existence. 
In Britain there has not been the same overt emphasis on nation building, 
for the obvious reason that the existence of the British state has not seemed par- 
ticularly problematic for the last hundred years, notwithstanding the Irish rebel- 
lion and the subsequent establishment in 1922 of the Irish Free State (even now 
a threatened constitutional upheaval in Scotland does not loom large in British 
consciousness). However, despite the lack of emphasis on nation building, com- 
munications technology has been considered too important to be left to the dic- 
tates of the market, for the market could not be relied upon to ensure that the 
public interest was taken into proper account. But that public interest has been 
defined in terms of access and availability at uniform cost, rather than in terms 
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of nationhood. So the British telephone system for most of its existence has 
been nationalised. Canada's industry on the other hand has developed on a 
mixed private and public basis, but it too has been regulated from its early days 
by federal and provincial authorities, and has since 1976 come under the juris- 
diction of the CTRC. In Britain, although the system was substantially 
privatised by the Conservative government in 1984, it is now regulated by Oftel 
(Office of Telecommunications), a body specifically set up to supervise the 
operations of British Telecom and its fledgeling competitor, Mercury Com- 
munications. 
As far as broadcasting is concerned, R.B. Bennett's speech in the House of 
Commons in 1932 epitomises the official Canadian approach, with its emphasis 
on the strengthening of national unity. 
This country must be assured of complete Canadian control of broad- 
casting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference or in- 
fluence. Without such control radio broadcasting can never become a 
great agency for the communication of matters of national concern and 
for the diffusion of national thought and ideals, and without such con- 
trol it can never be the agency by which national consciousness may be 
fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened 
(Bud, 1988: 112). 
In Britain the "brute force of monopoly" (Reith, 1949:99) which the BBC 
enjoyed under John Reith was justified in terms of ensuring the speedy achieve- 
ment of national coverage, something which private broadcasters would have 
been reluctant to provide, since it would have involved subsidking transmitters 
in remote areas from the more lucrative operations in the south of England. R.B. 
Bennett deployed a very similar argument in his 1932 speech. In both Britain 
and Canada there has been in discussion of broadcasting policy an additional 
and crucial emphasis on its potential for cultural enrichment. Reith (1924) put 
this in a typically forthright and unapologetic fashion in Broadcast over Britain, 
a book he wrote before the government-inspired British Broadcasting Company 
had been transformed into the Corporation it became in 1927. 
As we conceive it, our responsibility is to carry into the greatest pos- 
sible number of homes everything that is best in every department of 
human knowledge, endeavour and achievement, and to avoid the 
things which are, or may be hurtful. It is occasionally indicated to us 
that we are apparently setting out to give the public what we think they 
need-and not what they want, but few know what they want, and very 
few what they need. There is often no difference. One wonders to 
which section of the public such criticism refers. In any case it is better 
to over-estimate the mentality of the public, than to under-estimate it 
(Reith, 1924:34). 
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The idea that broadcasting is not simply a technology for disseminating in- 
formation but an enricher of people's lives has run through debates on the 
subject in Britain since Reith wrote these words. It was on the basis of that as- 
sumption that the Pilkington Committee (1962) criticised ITV so severely and 
even the Annan Committee (1977), the last wide ranging royal commission on 
broadcasting, which was generally seen as less committed to traditional cultural 
ideals, had this to say about the objectives of broadcasting: 
Traditionally, the State has set broadcasters their objectives. At 
present, their role is to provide entertainment, information and educa- 
tion for large audiences. It is hard to conceive of a programme which 
would not be held in some way to inform, educate or entertain at least 
some section of the population. We would add to the list a further ob- 
jective, unfortunately incapable of being put in statutory form, namely 
enrichment To enlarge people's interests, to convey to them new 
choices and possibilities in life, this is what broadcasting ought to try 
to achieve. Sir Huw Wheldon, with remarkable brevity, has said that 
programmes should "create delight and insight". This sums up our 
views (Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting, 
1977:27). 
In Canada the Task Force on Broadcasting of 1986 for its part was very 
clear that cultural objectives must be to the fore in broadcasting policy. 
Our first priority is to make the broadcasting system serve Canadian 
culture, broadly defined, more effectively in the future than it has done 
in the past. We want the system to be program-driven, with Canadians , 
able to choose from a substantial number of quality Canadian 
programs (Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 1986:4 1) 
This was seen as a crucial part of the fight to secure cultural sovereignty. 
... the Task Force had little difficulty in reaching its views on the issue 
of Canada's cultural sovereignty. Only one conclusion is possible 
under our priorities. We interpret cultural sovereignty to refer to our 
own control of our cultural destiny, our own control of the instruments 
of decision-making which determine our cultural future. The broad- 
casting system has a pre-eminent role to play in both nurturing and 
reflecting Canadian culture. Governments must therefore not consider 
measures to achieve the objectives of Canadian broadcasting as mere 
chips that may be traded across a bargaining table. Canadians must 
maintain the sovereign right to make whatever decisions we deem 
necessary to protect our own culture (Report on the Task force on 
Broadcasting Policy, 198641). 
In both countries broadcasting developed at a point in history when the 
modem democratic state, based on adult suffrage, had come into being. The 
early struggles between newspapers and government over access to information 
had been resolved in favour of the right of the public to know-in theory at 
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least-unless the security of the state dictated otherwise. The development of 
the cinema had led to the establishment of national and/or local systems of cen- 
sorship, the objective of which was to protect the public in general and young 
people in particular against "unsuitable" material. "Unsuitability" has usually 
meant excessively violent, over-explicit sexually, linguistically objectionable 
and on occasion politically "subversive". 
Because broadcasting offers such a comprehensive service of actuality fic- 
tion and diversion, inevitably the kinds of issues which have been debated 
throughout the development of the press and the cinema have come to be seen 
as issues which arise there too. But bechuse the technology of broadcasting of- 
fered the potential of universal simultaneous transmission, then the question of 
its national significance and power had to be faced by governments as the 
primary issue. To the modem observer it might seem that the issue of cultural 
sovereignty should have been well to the fore in public policy discussion before 
the development of broadcasting, since it was already clear by the end of the 
First World War that the American cinema industry would use its economic 
muscle to dominate the world. Discussion of that issue, however, developed 
only gradually, for cinema, being part of the entertainment industry, was never 
taken as seriously by policy makers as broadcasting. So in Britain the first at- 
tempt to impose a minimum quota of British product on exhibiton came in 
1927, five years after the BBC was established, while in Canada no significant 
government action was taken until the establishment of the National Film Board 
in 1939. History has moved on, however, and it is now no longer possible in 
Canada to discuss any of the media without an engagement with the cultural 
sovereignty argument. And in Britain, as we shall see, that argument is now 
more central than it has ever been. 
Nonetheless it cannot be claimed that there are at present unified com- 
munications/media policies in either country. Policies remain pragmatic and to a 
large extent reflect the balance between the various contending forces, 
entrepreneurs, practitioners, politicians, consumers and advocates of the public 
good. Only in broadcasting has it been possible to establish the pursuit of the 
public good firmly at the centre of discussion. That public good has been 
variously defined with varying emphases, but the basic principles as far as 
broadcasting is concemed have been universal access, at reasonably uniform 
cost, independence from government and other powerful interests and above all 
the provision of a wide range of indigenous programming of quality which 
reflects the life of the society concemed. (The British Film Institute's Broad- 
casting Research Unit [I9861 has offered a useful discussion of these ideas.) 
Over the years the debates in Britain and Canada have followed similar courses, 
but action has recently been much easier in the UK. Criticisms of the CRTC and 
its members have sometimes been very harsh-witness Herschel Hardin's 
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(1985) vitriolic attack-but it would be foolish to underestimate the difficulties 
of regulating a broadcasting system, which has been "invaded" by a foreign 
power in a way that Canada's has. John Meisel, a former chairman of the 
CRTC, who is not spared Hardin's lash, has offered eloquent testimony to that 
fact (Meisel, 1984). 
It is generally assumed that public service broadcasting is under pressure 
universally at the present time. It is not just CBC which feels itself beleaguered, 
but also the BBC and ITV companies in Britain too. These companies have 
taken to describing themselves as public service broadcasters, on the grounds 
that although they are financed by advertising, they are tightly regulated in the 
public interest. (This characterisation has, it should be added, produced a jaun- 
diced response from commentators such as Garnham, 1989.) In continental 
Europe state-sponsored broadcasting organisations have found themselves 
under pressure to curtail their demands on public funds, and even in Scan- 
dinavia, which held out for a long time against advertising finance, Denmark 
has succumbed and the other Nordic countries may soon do so. At the same 
time expansion of the commercial sector has exposed the public service broad- 
casters to increased competition, and in some cases they have been forced to be- 
come more commercial themselves. In the United States the struggling PBS is 
having to compete in the acquisition markets with the Discovery and Arts and 
Entertainment cable channels, and with its myriad of sponsors' announcements 
at the beginning and end of programmes looks more and more like commercial 
television-as indeed does CBC TV at peak times. 
It is possible to identify a number of related forces which have been at 
work and which have made life more difficult for public service broadcasters. 
First of all there has been technological change. Cable has been around for 
a long time but its potential for delivery of an ever larger number of channels 
and of interactive non-programme services has been enhanced by the develop- 
ment of fibre optic cable, the capacity of which greatly outstrips the capacity of 
copper coaxial cable. Telecommunications satellites have been with us since the 
1960s. However the use of satellites for direct broadcasting to the customer is a 
recent development. Both cable and satellite appear to offer a solution to the 
problem of scarcity of wavelengths, which was one of the reasons for regulation 
of broadcasting even in countries like the USA where the free enterprise model 
was accepted, and encouraged. The video recorder-which has made a greater 
impact proportionately in the UK than anywhere else in the world-is the third 
major technological change which should be mentioned. Its dual function, the 
"timeshifting" of broadcast material, however received, and the viewing of pur- 
chased or rented non-broadcast material gives it a flexibility, which traditional 
delivery systems lack. 
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These technological changes have offered business opportunities from the 
humblest level-the small dealer who sells VCRs to the highest-the interna- 
tional media entrepreneurs who have seized the chance to expand their empires. 
The political climate has been right for such private sector involvement. 
There have been many analyses of why the 1980s have been the decade of 
deregulation and privatisation. Dissatisfaction with collectivist solutions and a 
renewed enthusiasm for individualism in both private and public activities will, 
one suspects, be seen as no more than a passing phase by future historians, per- 
haps a necessary corrective to the complacency of liberals and socialists who 
become so committed to the corporate state that they did not notice its inef- 
ficiencies and its corruptions. Be that as it may, the deregulators have made a 
significant impact-in Britain, perhaps most of all. Here deregulation, and its 
soulmate, privatisation, have cut a swathe through the economy, so that in a 
country where the big national corporations were once more likely that not to be 
nationalised corporations, all has been mansformed, and not only have industries 
like steel and oil been returned to the private sector, but utilities like water and 
electricity are about to be transformed into private sector companies, albeit with 
regulatory bodies to oversee them to ensure that they do not operate against the 
public interest. (It is one of the paradoxes of the privatisation programme than 
in the name of eliminating government involvement more government regula- 
tion has had to be introduced.) 
Straightforward deregulation in Britain can be seen most clearly in the 
removing of alleged "restrictions" on employers' freedom to operate, and in the 
imposing of restrictions on trade unions' ability to take action against 
employers. Canada does not seem to have caught the deregulation or privatisa- 
tion bugs to quite the same extent. To the outside observer the striking thing 
about Canada is the number of its citizens who will tell the visitor that Canada 
"has the best of capitalism and the best of socialism." What is meant,I think, is 
that Canada is a country where it is accepted that private enterprise is the best 
engine for creating wealth, but that wealth has to be shared out in a reasonably 
equitable fashion, and people are obliged to have some kind of concern for each 
other, particularly when misfortune strikes. This view seems to be very wide- 
spread and deep-rooted, so that Canadian politics do not exhibit the polarisation 
which has characterised British politics throughout the eighties. It is not al- 
together surprising that Canadian voters have some difficulty in choosing be- 
tween the three main parties, for the differences among them do not seem to be 
nearly as obvious as those between the Labour and Conservative parties in 
Britain. So despite the enthusiasm for privatisation of Mr. Bill Vander Zalm's 
Social Credit administration in British Columbia, it is not surprising that when 
the Mulroney government came forward with its plan to privatise Air Canada it 
was proposing to retain over half of the shares itself. Nonetheless privatisation 
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had been on the agenda in Canada and elsewhere, and that has made it extreme- 
ly difficult for public service broadcasters to defend their positions and to take 
maximum advantage of technological developments. 
The attitudes of politicians to broadcasters, particularly public sector broad- 
casters, has been another relevant factor. Politicians do not generally like broad- 
casters very much. It is in the nature of both trades that the relationship is bound 
to be a prickly one, and it is in the interests of democracy that it should remain 
so. It is not therefore surprising to hear about tiffs between British cabinet mini- 
sters and television interviewers, or that a senior Canadian politician was al- 
legedly reluctant that CBC be given another channel, since that would mean 
"these bastards" would be able to double their criticisms of him. However, the 
relationship in Britain has in recent years become worse than the one in Canada. 
There are a number of specific reasons for this. First of all, the broadcasting sys- 
tem, both commercial and non-commercial sectors, is perceived as being the 
embodiment of the consensual corporate statist approach, which the present 
government and Mrs. Thatcher in particular, are determined to eradicate. Con- 
sensus as a mode of problem-solving has been replaced by conviction. It is not 
just that the BBC is a public sector corporation and that ITV is regulated by the 
IBA, a public sector quango, but that the values these organisations embody are 
anathema to the Prime Minister and to several of her closest associates. Further- 
more both parts of the system are seen as insulated from market forces-despite 
the fact that television-viewing figures are the highest in Europe-and ineffi- 
cient in their use of labour and resources. 
A second reason is the growing authoritarianism of the present government. 
It has won three successive elections and although its share of the vote in the 
second and third of these has barely reached 43 per cent, this has ensured over- 
whelming dominance of the House of Commons. It is now a supremely self- 
confident government, led by a woman who has put her personal stamp on her 
party's victories. It has become--and some commentators have argued this 
stems largely, if not exclusively, from Margaret Thatcher's character-the most 
authoritarian government of the post-war era. At the heart of Thatcherism is a 
combination of economic liberalism and social illiberalism. The state must en- 
sure the minimum of regulation for private (and privatised) business but is per- 
fectly entitled to strengthen its control of the public's access to government 
information, and to resist challenges to the government's authority or threats to 
"traditional" moral values. So attempts to establish a Freedom of Information 
Act have run into implacable opposition-indeed the revised Official Secrets 
Act is generally regarded as more draconian than the original-the government 
has pursued an ex-spy around the globe in order to prevent publication of his 
memoirs, and workers at the government's communications headquarters have , 
been told that their employment is incompatible with trade union membership. 
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As far as broadcasting is concerned, there have been a number of incidents 
where the government's concern to limit information and criticism has been 
very clear. In 1985 for example BBC Scotland commissioned a series of films 
from Duncan Campbell, an investigative journalist, with the title "The Secret 
Society". The subject of one of these was a spy satellite, the construction of 
which Campbell alleged had been concealed from the relevant House of Com- 
mons committee. Before the programme could be transmitted government pres- 
sure led to its withdrawal on "the grounds of national security" in January 1987, 
and shortly thereafter BBC Scotland's Glasgow studios were raided by special 
branch police-the special branch is concerned with political subversion-and 
papers and videotapes were carried off, allegedly in order to ascertain whether 
the Official Secrets Act has been breached. No prosecution has ever been 
brought and the original programme has since been transmitted, but the message 
was clear. There have been other instances of government pressure on the 
broadcasters, including an attempt to prevent Thames Television broadcasting a 
programme which cast doubt on the official version of the killing of IRA mem- 
bers in Gibralter in May 1988. The culmination of all this pressure was the in- 
voking by the Home Secretary in October 1988 of reserve powers which have 
not been used in peace time, to order broadcasters to refrain from interviewing 
representatives of the IRA, Sinn Fein, the UDA and other terrorist organisations 
in Ulster, whether, as was the case with some Sinn Fein representatives, they 
were legally elected councillors or MPs or not. 
One of the striking features of the Thatcher years which has made life easy 
for the Government has been the weakness of British civil society. The govern- 
ment has been able to appoint to public bodies individuals sympathetic to its 
views, and to dispense with the services of those who are less sympathetic. No 
government would have attempted this before 1979 on the scale on which it has 
occurred. Furthermore, areas of society such as the education system and the 
arts, which might have been expected to resist, have been either unwilling or 
unable to do so. Attempts by the Church of England to mount some kind of op- 
position have been treated as akin to subversion by government spokesmen and 
the many newspapers sympathetic to their cause. It has to be added that in Scot- 
land the resistance has been greater, both at the electoral level (where the Con- 
servative party has been reduced to less than a quarter of the popular vote) and 
at the institutional level. 
The conditions described above do not seem to pertain in Canada. A con- 
servative federal government has been in power since 1984, but it does not give 
the impression that it wishes to reduce civil society to total acquiescence, nor is 
it able, should it so wish, to exercise the kind of controls on the flow of informa- 
tion which have been employed in Britain. Public service broadcasters do not 
seem to be perceived in the same hostile light (though cynics might observe that 
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the weak position of CBC vis 2 vis the commercial broadcasters renders it a 
much less powerful potential enemy than the BBC and ITV are sometimes seen 
to be in British government circles). Fundamentally, Canada remains a much 
more consensual society than Britain has become--or the vagaries of the first 
past the post electoral system have allowed it to become. 
What follows from the above is that the Caplan-Sauvageau Task Force and 
the Peacock Committee on financing the BBC, which both submitted their 
reports in 1986, were working in a general climate which favoured the private 
sector. But in Britain the situation was complicated by the attitudes of a govern- 
ment, hostile to public sector broadcasting, and supremely self-confident. The 
divergence could be seen in the choice of chairmen: it is inconceivable that the 
Thatcher government would have asked an opposition politician to co-chair a 
report on broadcasting. The British government's choice, Sir Alan Peacock, was 
a noted free market economist, who was later asked to chair the Scottish Arts 
Council, the Scottish arm of the Arts Council of Great Britain, an organisation 
which has also been "Thatcherised". 
The Task Force Report's proposals evoke a rather nostalgic feeling in the 
British observer. The emphasis on the importance of the public sector, English 
and French, on the need to both support and expand that sector through higher 
appropriations to CBC, the proposals for the creation of an all news channel and 
of TV-Canada, and the insistence that the commercial sector should improve the 
quality of its product remind one of the Pilkington Report (1962), which paved 
the way for BBC2, and forced the British commercial television companies to 
improve their programme performance. Of course the Task Force was operating 
in a much more commercially driven environment than has ever existed in 
Britain, and it is easy to be cynical about the motives of some of the players in 
this particular drama. But reaction from the Mulroney government, however 
slow it was in coming, suggested that it had accepted that there would have to 
be greater support for the public sector. The government's rather half-hearted 
enthusiasm for private sector solutions could be seen lurking behind the insis- 
tence that the CBC satellite to cable news channel should have some commer- 
cial involvement, but in the summer of 1988 when the government brought 
forward its proposals, it did seem as if the Cabinet had accepted the basic thrust 
of the Task Force's recommendations. Public reaction from CTV and the other 
commercial operators suggested that they too, however reluctantly, had come to 
accept that they were going to have to make a better job of pursuing Canadian 
cultural objectives than they had done thitherto. 
As the the Mulroney government's motivation, it was clear that the minister 
concerned was very committed to increasing Canadian content. She was no 
doubt helped by the all-party standing committee on Communication and , 
Culture's comments on the Task Force, which came out shortly before her 
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announcement. However it remains significant that a government of the right, 
which has shown some enthusiasm for privatisation and deregulation, was ap- 
parently committing itself to increased regulation of the private sector and in- 
creased support for the public sector. The Free Trade Treaty was obviously an 
important factor here. The Mulroney govemment, reversing the historic Conser- 
vative position, had negotiated the treaty with the US. For all that cultural goods 
were specifically, if somewhat provisionally, excluded from the treaty, there 
were widespread fears of loss of cultural sovereignty. To any astute politician 
the summer of 1988, with the free trade debate honing up and an election start- 
ing to seem inevitable, was a good time to offer increased government support 
for the Canadianisation of broadcasting. The post-election cutbacks of the CBC 
budget have of course had a considerable souring effect, though it is too early to 
be sure about the ultimate fate of the Task Force's proposals. 
In Britain the deregulation bandwagon in broadcasting started rolling with 
the Hunt Report (1982), which led to the Cable and Broadcasting Act (1984). 
Hunt reflected the government's view that Britain stood to gain economically 
out of the growth of cable, because of the country's lead in fibre optic technol- 
ogy. It also followed the govemment in advocating entertainment services as a 
basis on which future interactive services could be built. Ministerial pronounce- 
ments suggested that a "wired society" was just around the comer, but in fact it 
is clear that the Cable Act was the first attempt to increase the range of commer- 
cially supported television services available to the public, and at the same time 
to undermine the so-called "comfortable duopoly" of BBC and ITV. In fact 
cable development in the UK has been very slow. To date only 1.5 million 
homes are passed, and less than 20 per cent of these homes have bought the ser- 
vices on offer (Broadcust, 1989). This is not surprising, for in a country with 
four off-air channels and over half the homes in the land owning video re- 
corders, which are used mainly to time shift, it would have been truly 
astonishing if substantial numbers of people had felt obliged to pay for addition- 
al services, which compared poorly in range and quality with what is available 
either free, or in return for a tax which is difficult to avoid, the television licence 
fee. 
The Peacock Committee was set up in 1985 to inquire into the future 
finance of the BBC on the ostensible ground that there was a difficulty in con- 
tinuing to persuade the public to fund the Corporation through the licence fee. 
This difficulty, which politicians of both major parties have been known to cite 
when the BBC has asked for an increase, does not seem to be borne out by any 
reliable research, although there is some evidence that when asked if the BBC 
should take advertising and so reduce the licence fee or even abolish it, people 
will reply in the affirmative. The consequences of two large broadcasting or- 
ganisations chasing the same advertisers for a limited amount of advertising are 
86 Broadcasting Policy in Canada and the U.K./D. Hutchison 
rarely spelt out to respondents in such surveys. Peacock was asked to consider 
the introduction of advertising and sponsorship on BBC services and to consider 
other ways of raising revenue, which might be used as an alternative to the 
licence fee. 
The committee ranged more widely than its remit required, and performed 
a useful service in so doing. The basic thrust of its report, however, mirrored the 
government's thinking about choice and the sovereignty of the consumer. 
"The fundamental aim of broadcasting policy should in our view be to en- 
large both the freedom of choice of the consumer and the opportunities avail- 
able to programme makers to offer alternative wares to the public" (Report of 
the Committee on Financing the BBC: 125). 
However, the economic liberalism was accompanied by a social liberalism 
which was much less in tune with government thinking, for Peacock advocated 
that as regulation of the system was phased out, so only the normal laws of the 
land on such matters as obscenity and defamation should apply to broadcasting, 
rather than the more restrictive codes currently employed by the BBC and the 
IBA. As to its deregulatory thrust, the committee rejected the idea that it was 
advocating "commercial laissez faire" in broadcasting, which would involve 
complete deregulation and privatisation. 
The recommendations of the committee were grouped so that their im- 
plementation would lead the British broadcasting system "towards a sophisti- 
cated market system based on consumer sovereignty." This, "the third stage", is 
seen as one where "a full broadcasting market" obtains. In the first stage the 
BBC's licence fee was to be indexed against inflation, while in the second, sub- 
scription-via peritelevision sockets and encrypting technology- was to be- 
come the main source of BBC income. The committee split on the immediate 
privatisation of two BBC radio channels (the popular music ones) with five 
members favouring immediate privatisation, and the committee as a whole 
favouring the BBC being given this option for consideration. ITV franchises, 
the committee recommended, should be auctioned at the next renewal date to 
the highest bidder, with the Independent Broadcasting Authority having thc 
right to turn the highest bid down, but with the obligation to make a public 
statement as to its reasons. Channel Four, the innovative channel set up by the 
Conservatives in 1982 as a result of a recommendation of the Annan Commit- 
tee, and financed indirectly by the ITV companies, was to be given the option of 
going it alone and selling its own advertising time. Both ITV and the BBC were 
to be required to move within ten years into the situation where 40 per cent of 
their programmes came from independent producers. A Public Service Broad- 
casting Council was to be established in order to support programmes and ser- 
vices which would not otherwise exist in this new broadcasting market place. 
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There is no question that Peacock marked a watershed in discussion of 
British broadcasting. Although the report talks a lot about the inevitability of 
technology producing an end to the current system and of itself producing a 
market where the consumer was king, there is no doubt that the basic driving 
force, which was reflected in the committee's membership, and above all its 
chairmanship, is enthusiasm for privatisation. The broadcasters were now faced 
with a dilemma. They could fight against the basic philosophy of the report or 
they could embark on a damage limitation exercise, apparently embracing some 
of Peacock's recommendations, but resisting those which threatened to under- 
mine their overall position. They chose the latter strategy, hoping, one suspects, 
that the General Election due in 1988 at the latest, would leave the government 
with a much reduced majority and much less enthusiasm for Peacock's more 
radical ideas. In the interim both BBC and ITV accepted that they would have 
to take a significant proportion of their programmes from the independent sector 
and began the process of making themselves look more efficient and cost-con- 
scious. The election in June 1987 scarcely dented the Conservative majority, so 
the broadcasters then had no option but to accept that they faced a government 
determined to change the structure of British broadcasting. 
It became clear that the government was at odds with itself as to which 
direction it should take. The more traditional Tory paternalists, to an extent rep- 
resented by the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, favoured some kind of com- 
promise between Peacock's free market approach and public service ideals, 
while the Prime Minister, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Nigel Lawson, 
supported the free market. In the event the government's White Paper, Broad- 
casting in the 90s: Competition, Choice and Qualify published in November 
1988, proposed that the BBC should not be privatised but that its licence fee, 
which had already been inflation indexed post-Peacock, should be de-indexed 
after 1991, and that the Corporation should increasingly seek revenue fkom sub- 
scription. As the White Paper said, "The Government looks forward to the even- 
tual replacement of the licence fee." ITV franchises were to be auctioned to the 
highest bidder, after applicants had passed a "quality threshold," and the future 
of Channel Four was opened to discussion. Restrictions on hostile takeovers of 
ITV companies were to be abolished. The government envisaged one additional 
national terrestrial channel being set up and possibly a sixth, and more services 
being beamed in via satellite. Local television, using cable and microwave 
transmission, were also proposed. All of these non-BBC services would raise 
finance through advertising, sponsorship and subscription. 
A new authority was to replace the IBA and to operate with a lighter touch 
as would the new Radio Authority which regulated commercial radio, which is 
also expected to expand substantially under plans set out in a consultative docu- 
ment in 1987. The economic liberalism was not accompanied by cultural 
88 Broadcasting Policy in Canada and the U.K./D. Hutchison 
liberalism, for the White Paper made it clear that the Broadcasting Standards 
Council, established by the government early in 1988, with the remit of 
monitoring and reporting on the portrayal of sex and violence, and standards of 
taste and decency, was here to stay, on a statutory footing. Furthermore 
obscenity legislation would be extended in scope to cover broadcasting. 
The reception accorded to the White Paper was not favourable. Newspapers 
owned by Rupert Murdoch, who has a direct interest in the commercialisation 
of British broadcasting, were enthusiastic, but other paper-including Conser- 
vative papers-were womed that British broadcasting would cease to be the 
byword for high standards and popular p rogramming which it is generally con- 
sidered to be. Both parts of the broadcasting industry were again faced with a 
dilemma, and there was no general election in the offing to offer hope of 
change. The ensuing campaign by the broadcasters suffered from lack of unity 
and the desire in several quarters to save as much of one's own bacon as was 
possible. So the BBC, which at one point pre-Peacock had feared that it might 
lose one of its two television channels, preened itself on being described in the 
White Paper as "the cornerstone of public service broadcasting" and hesitated 
about contesting the idea that it should move to subscription; it happily cited 
some experiments in downloading programmes to doctors in the middle of the 
night, which had gained a few thousand customers, as evidence that it was 
taking subscription seriously. The Corporation then regained its nerve and ar- 
gued for the retention of the licence fee as a necessary basis for universal 
coverage in both radio and television. But it did not see fit to comment on the 
proposals for ITV nor to offer any opinion whatsoever about the future of Chan- 
nel Four. In the light of the government's open solicitation of opinions, this was 
a distinctly odd omission, which can only be explained by a desire to be seen as 
not causing too much trouble. The ITV companies for their part had difficulty in 
arriving at a collective position, but resisted the idea of auctioning franchises to 
the highest bidder, as did the IBA, which also argued for a continuing role for a 
regulatory body willing to insist on high programme standards across the 
board-and not just in news and current affairs, which is what the White Paper 
had laid down. Channel Four argued for some form of trust to preserve its 
programming remit. 
Anyone involved in this debate has been struck by a number of facts. First 
of all it is clear that Mrs. Thatcher has either cowed or converted the liberal elite 
of the great and the good. Despite widespread hostility to the government's 
plans, there was no concerted campaign of the sort which took place against the 
introduction of ITV in the 1950s, or indeed against restrictions in the hours of 
broadcasting of the Third Programmevery much a minority radio channel-in 
1957. Opposition politicians did offer criticisms, as did various other public 
bodies, but there has been no great national movement. In addition it has been 
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clear that with the broadcasters on the defensive, they have seemed to be engag- 
ing in special pleading on their own behalf. Indeed anyone who supported the 
ITV companies in their arguments against the highest bidder approach to 
franchise allocation has felt uneasy that he might appear to be offering uncriti- 
cal support to companies whose performance has not always been of the best. 
The situation might well have been greatly improved if there had been a British 
equivalent of the Canadian Friends of Public Broadcasting. 
There is an organisation called Voice of the Listener, but as the name im- 
plies it is primarily concerned with radio: furthermore it is based in the south of 
England and has difficulty engaging with popular taste. Friends of Public 
Broadcasting is much more firmly established, and while it might be argued that 
the history of broadcasting in Canada does not suggest that it has had a great 
impact, and its own publications are characterised at times by a somewhat 
apocalyptic tone, nonetheless the existence of an independent body, member- 
ship of which is open to all, which argues for high standards, would be a very 
useful addition to the British scene. In the past British broadcasters have basked 
rather complacently in the assumed security of their position, and at times that 
complacency has bordered on arrogance. There are some signs that they have 
now grasped that the enlisting of active public support will be necessary in the 
future. 
In the current debate one argument which has surfaced, which echoes a per- 
petual Canadian concern, is that of cultural sovereignty. British broadcasting 
has till now been highly regulated, and it has been highly protected, with up to 
85 per cent of television programmes being made in the country. So although 
there have been occasional complaints about the incursion of American 
programming, this is not an issue which has caused too much anxiety, for the 
protection enjoyed by the broadcasters has been used to build up large audien- 
ces for domestic programming. The weekly viewing figures demonstrate the 
preference for domestic drama, although that preference has not prevented the 
Australian soap opera Neighbours enjoying high success with the audience, nor 
De Grassi Junior High doing extremely well with young people. However, al- 
though American material is watched, it does not dominate British viewing. But 
during the discussion about de-regulation, before and after the government's 
White Paper was published, the phrase "wall-to-wall Dallas" was heard 
repeatedly. The Home Secretary denied that he wished to see any such thing, 
but the programming offered by the cable companies-to the few people who 
purchased their service-and by Sky Television, which started offering its full 
DBS service in early 1989 to Britain from a Luxembourg-owned satellite, bore 
out the suspicion that deregulation did not mean better British broadcasting but 
inferior American broadcasting. The poor sales of satellite-receiving dishes 
have tended to confirm in their convictions those observers who believe that the 
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British audience will not be easily persuaded to adandon its existing services for 
satellite or cable ones, unless these services offer something new and better than 
what is already available. Alternatively, if the terrestrial channels are weakened, 
by having their financial base eroded to the point where they can no longer sup- 
port the current range of programmes and the distinctiveness of their services 
becomes less obvious, then the satellite services will get their opening. 
This is being written as the government drafts its new Broadcasting Act. 
There has been some modification of the proposed I W  franchise bid procedure, 
with the regulatory body given--as Peacock suggested-the rights to turn down 
a bid "in exceptional circumstances" and powers to penalise franchise holders 
who fail to deliver on quality programme promises. A lot will depend on how 
tough the Independent Television Commission, the successor to the IBA, is al- 
lowed to be, and how "quality" is defined. Channel Four is to be converted into 
a trust, with a guarantee that if in selling its own advertising time it fails to ob- 
tain 14 per cent of national expenditure on terresmal television advertising then 
the ITC will raise a levy from the ITV (renamed Channel Thiee) companies. 
However ownership by EEC-based companies and "hostile" takeovers will not 
be made illegal. The basic thrust of the government's policies has not changed. 
We now have a fair idea then what the future shape of British broadcasting 
is likely to be. I W  will become more commercial, more business-oriented, less 
programme-oriented. It will have to compete for its revenue with a restructured 
Channel Four, with a new terrestrial channel, covering most of Britain (though 
not all of the lucrative south of England) and such cable and satellite channels 
as survive. The BBC will remain as the public service broadcaster, its financial 
future very uncertain after 1991, with subscription firmly on the agenda. There 
will be less regulation on the economic front and more on the moral front. What 
is very far from clear is how the audience will react. My own feeling is that the 
British audience is an educated one-it may like soap operas and game shows, 
but it also watches news, current affairs, documentaries, wild life programmes 
and intelligent indigenous drama. It is unlikely to respond positively if its op- 
portunities to choose from such a wide-ranging menu are diminished. 
As the British situation moves towards some kind of immediate pro tern 
resolution, the Canadian one seems confused. As Marc Raboy (1989) has 
pointed out, Bill C-136, though far from perfect, did represent significant 
progress as far as the public interest lobby groups were concerned, for it em- 
phasised that Canadian broadcasting should, inter alia, improve employment 
opportunities for Canadians, enlighten its audiences and include community 
programmes. The bill fell with the November 1988 election and although the 
new Communications Minister is Marcel Masse, who was responsible for set- 
ting up the Caplan-Sauvageau Task Force, he has come into office at a time 
when his government is imposing further budget cuts on CBC. This action must 
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put at risk the efforts of the Corporation to increase its Canadian input, and has 
raised the spectre of advertising having to be introduced on the radio services 
and in television news programmes. The Mulroney government does seem to be 
in a difficult situation: it is apparently committed to the objectives of the Task 
Force, and presumably its new Broadcasting Bill will reflect that fact, but its 
financial policies render the achievement of these objectives almost impossible. 
Ironically, on this occasion it is not so much that the government's ideological 
convictions are in conflict with its desire to promote Canadian culture as that 
simple financial necessity-a larger per capita external debt that the one which 
affects the US--has been the imperative. 
The 0bse~er  of the broadcasting scenes in Canada and Britain, who at- 
tempts to stand back from the immediate situation, finds himself drawing a 
number of provisional conclusions about the contending forces. 
The role of technology is obviously crucial to understanding what is hap- 
pening and mention was made earlier of recent technological development. Yet 
as Robert Babe (1988) has forcibly pointed out, it is dangerous and foolish to 
assume that some kind of technological determinism is at work. Technology is 
not a divinely ordained force whose progress is to outwit the control of ordinary 
mortals. On the contrary, decisions about which technologies are developed and 
how they are developed stem from the interaction of a number of forces, only 
one of which is purely technological. The Concorde aeroplane does not fly back 
and forward across the Atlantic, losing money and probably damaging the 
ozone layer, because the technology of supersonic flight necessitates its exist- 
ence. It is there because successive British and French governments believed- 
erroneously-that such an aircraft would offer excellent export opportunities for 
their indigenous aerospace industries, and would also be a marvellous symbol of 
technological sophistication. The nuclear power industry in Britain has not 
developed because it was technologically possible, but because in the initial 
stages at any rate it was a good vehicle for the manufacture of the raw material 
from which weapons-grade plutonium might be obtained. If it continues to ex- 
pand in the future it will be in spite of the fact that it is economically ruinous, 
and to a large extent because the present British government wishes to destroy 
permanently the economic power of the coal miners. The home video recorder 
was not inevitable after the broadcasting industry began to use Arnpex machines 
in the 1960s, but only came about because the industrial-governmental alliance 
which runs modem Japan saw its potential on the domestic front and was 
prepared to devote the investment funds necessary to produce an efficient and 
affordable domestic model. The relatively slow development of effective con- 
traception was not due entirely to technical and medical difficulties. The at- 
titude of society to its desirability was just as significant a factor. 
92 Broadcasting Policy in Canada and the U.K./D. Hutchison 
What all of these examples suggests is that technological change interacts 
with political, economic and social forces. We are the masters of technology, 
but our control operates in complex ways which are sometimes so difficult to 
unravel that it is easier to talk of technological imperatives and technological 
determinism. What is clear from the development of broadcasting in recent 
years is that technology has been used quite unashamedly in order to promote 
particular political policies. The British government's "gee whiz" endorsement 
of the "wired society" owed as much to its desire to lessen the power of the ex- 
isting broadcasters as it did to any genuine belief in the interactive future, and 
its current enthusiasm for cable and satellite TV, which are often spoken of as if 
they were technologically inevitable, stems directly from its hostility to the 
"comfortable duopoly" of the BBC and ITV, a hostility which is as much politi- 
cal as it is economic. The frequent endorsement of the technological imperative 
by Canadian government officials catalogued and derided by Babe, can easily 
be represented as a political unwillingness to challenge the power of the com- 
mercial organisations who have gained so much !?om the colonialisation of 
Canadlan culture. 
It is the political process and its interaction with the economic system 
which is cenml. That is why the privatisation/deregulation debate is so impor- 
tant, for it has represented a different kind of accommodation between the 
political and economic than what has been obtained up till now. In Canada that 
shift has not been so obvious as in Britain, for, whatever the rhetoric, Canadian 
broadcasting has been dominated by the commercial sector for a long time, and 
regulation-by British standardsAas been more apparent than real. In Britain, 
however, the shift has clearly signalled that the public service orientation of 
broadcasting is to change and the market is to become the model. That is why 
the Peacock Report is so important, for it represents a crucial ideological mo- 
ment in British discussion of broadcasting policy. As noted earlier, Caplan 
Sauvageau gives voice to concerns and ideas about the purposes of broadcasting 
which in the British content are destinctly pre-Peacock. 
In both countries, cultural sovereignty has been articulated as something 
which stands in opposition to supposed technological and economic deter- 
minants. It has been a Canadian issue since the inception of broadcasting, but 
has only become a British issue as the government's vision of the future has un- 
folded before the eyes of the public. It is now clear to the British-though if we 
had asked the Canadians they could have told us long ago-that the free play of 
market forces and the retention of cultural sovereignty are not easily com- 
patible. They may be compatible in the United States, where, whatever may be 
said about the quality of much American broadcasting, it cannot be denied that 
it is almost entirely American, but the United States is (still just) the most 
powerful economy on earth, and its cultural "software" indusmes have long 
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since established a position of extraordinary dominance at home and abroad. 
Canadians have struggled for most of this century to come to terms with that 
cultural power and to retain some kind of say on how Canadian experience is 
represented to Canadians. 
If Britain is now waking up to the problem of cultural sovereignty (one is 
almost tempted to say England, for in Scotland, we have had to cope with cul- 
tural colonialism and the distortions it brings for a very long time) then it could 
perhaps learn something from Canada. That would be useful, and perhaps also 
humbling, for the British have some difficulty in believing that they can learn 
much from former colonies. The dangers of a broadcasting free market, weakly 
regulated, are very clear from the Canadian experience. But there are a couple 
of more positive things which are also clear. Firstly, there is always an appetite 
in any country for programming which talks about the experience of the people 
of that country. It may be difficult to provide it, but when it is provided, as 
CBC's (1984) statistics show, it does attract reasonable audiences. The scep- 
ticism shown by commentators such as Collins (1986) about how much of this 
material the audience does actually want cannot be dismissed out of hand, nor 
should Canadian-ness be used as an excuse for such things as the employment 
in dramatic fiction of narrative strategies which seem designed to produce 
audience non-involvement. But it is surely clear from the experience of the 
Qu6becois that cultural production must to a significant degree reflect the ex- 
perience of its audiences if it is to have any kind of meaningful resonance with 
those audiences. The distinctiveness of Qukbec and its language is not a reason 
for assuming that this general proposition is any less true of English Canada. 
The second lesson is that ways must be found in Britain of articulating the 
voice of the viewer and listener other than through audience rating charts. There 
is of course the danger of establishing an elite organisation doggedly middle 
class in origin and outlook. Nonetheless it is worth trying to find some 
mechanism for enfranchising the people for whom broadcasting is produced and 
on whose support it ultimately depends. It is here that Friends of Public Broad- 
casting perhaps offers a useful model as a starting point. For the BBC and ITV, 
with their retinue of advisory committees, appointed by the broadcasting or- 
ganisations themselves, a body, of this son if it achieved substantial member- 
ship and clout, would be a new force with which to deal. Such an organisation 
would also, one hopes, compel politicians to argue their case at more length and 
in a more stringent context, for instead of simply dealing with interested parties, 
they would be talking to a body which represented the very people the present 
British government says are at the heart of its plans for the future of broadcast- 
ing, the viewers and listeners. 
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